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CASE NOTES

FAMILY/TORT LAW - Through the Eyes and Ears of Children: A
Significant Advance for Third Parties Exposed to Domestic Violence.
Bevan v. Fix, 42 P.3d 1013 (Wyo. 2002).
INTRODUCTION

While national awareness of the impact of domestic violence on
women has been heightened for some time, the awareness of the impact on
children who witness domestic violence has been largely overlooked until
recently.' Over the past decade, researchers have compiled a significant
amount of empirical data showing the negative effects of children's exposure2
to domestic violence on their psychological development and functioning.
Children exposed to domestic violence can develop detrimental social, emotional, behavioral, and academic problems that can affect their long-term
functioning. Studies have shown that children exposed to domestic violence as third parties exhibit symptoms very similar to children who are di4
rect victims of domestic violence and abuse. Because of this relatively new
and growing awareness, the assessment of the needs of these children is in
5
an early stage of development. Researchers, social practitioners, and the

1. Betsy McAllister Groves, Mental Health Servicefor Children Who Witness Domestic
Violence, (2002), available at http://www.athealth.com/Practitioner/ceduc/dvchildren.html
(last visited Mar. 23, 2003). "[I]nterest in and concern about children who witness domestic
violence appear to be growing in the private and public sectors." Id.
Lois A. Weithom, ProtectingChildrenfrom Exposure to Domestic Violence: The Use
2.
and Abuse of Child Maltreatment, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 4 (2001). The negative effects of children's exposure to domestic violence include "aggressive conduct, anxiety symptoms, emotional withdrawal, and serious difficulties in school." Id. at 6. Research indicates that children exposed to domestic violence are more likely than children from nonviolent homes to
form emotional and adjustment problems as adults, as well as repeating the violent patterns
they observed as children. Id.
Id.
3.
Generally ... child witnesses of domestic violence ... exhibit more aggressive and antisocial behaviors ... as well as fearful and inhibited behaviors ... and show lower social competence than other children. Children who witnessed violence were also found to show more anxiety, selfesteem, depression, anger, and temperament problems than children who
did not witness violence at home. Children from homes where their
mothers were being abused have shown less skill in understanding how
others feel and examining situations from others' perspectives when compared to children from non-violent households.
Jeffrey Edleson, Problems Associated with Children's Witnessing of Domestic Violence,
(April 1999), available at http://www.vaw.umn.edu/documents/vawnet/witness/witness.html
(last visited Mar. 23, 2003).
Weithorn, supra note 2, at 6-7.
4.
Groves, supra note 1.
5.
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legal system now face the question of how to prevent children's exposure to
domestic violence and assist children who have already been exposed.6
Two children from Wyoming, Brittany and Steven Bevan, ages six
and three respectively, were exposed to domestic violence when, in March
1998, they witnessed the physical and verbal assault of their mother by her
boyfriend and former attorney. 7 As a result, Brittany and Steven sought recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress In March 2002, the
Wyoming Supreme Court evaluated Brittany's and Steven's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 9 Their claims afforded the court the
opportunity to further develop the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress in Wyoming, and decide what it means to be "present at the time"
for purposes of establishing a claim of third party intentional infliction of
emotional distress."0 More importantly, their claims are an example of the
tort's availability to those psychologically impacted by exposure to domestic
violence, and exemplifies the tort as one way to right the wrong of domestic
violence."
The story leading to Brittany's and Steven's claims for intentional
infliction of emotional distress began in July 1992, when Steven Bevan, the
children's father, hired William Fix, an attorney in Jackson, Wyoming, to
represent him on a domestic violence charge of criminal battery against
Jenni Jones, Bevan's then girlfriend.' 2 The course of proceedings against
Bevan ended in a plea agreement.' 3 Bevan and Jones married in December
1994.' 4 The couple had two biological children, Brittany and Steven
Bevan. 5 Brittany was born in August 1991, and Steven in April 1994.16 In
January 1997, Jones hired Fix to represent her in an action for divorce
against Bevan. 17 In June 1997, Fix terminated his representation of Jones
because he had commenced a sexual relationship with her.'
On March 29, 1998, Jones and her children spent the evening at
Fix's house. 9 Fix and Jones left the children in the care of two teenage
6.
Weithorn, supra note 2, at 8.
7. Bevan v. Fix, 42 P.3d 1013, 1025 (Wyo. 2002).
8.
Id. at 1018.
9.
Id.
10.
Id. at 1024.
11.
The tort affords "one way of righting [the] grievous wrong [of domestic violence]."
Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619, 643 (Tex. 1993) (Spector, J., dissenting).
12.
Bevan, 42 P.3d at 1017. William Fix is an attorney licensed to practice in Wyoming
with an office in Jackson. Id.
13.
Id.
14.
Id.
15.
Id.
16.
Id.
17.
Id.
18.
Id.
19.
Id.
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2
babysitters while they spent most of the evening drinking in a local bar. "
Upon returning to Fix's home, Fix, Jones, and two other guests bathed in
2
Fix's hot tub and continued drinking. ' In the hot tub, Fix and Jones en22
gaged in a verbal altercation that eventually led to physical confrontation.
These verbal and physical altercations continued over the next few hours and
culminated in the violent physical confrontation that was the basis of Brittany's and Steven's claims.23

Early the next morning, Fix awakened Jones and attacked her with

violent conduct that included kicking, punching, pushing, choking, and

24
screaming that he was going to kill her. Jones's children and the two babysitters observed parts of this violent altercation, although it is unclear from
23
the record exactly what Brittany observed. When Brittany was questioned
as to what she remembered of the events, she stated:

Well, I woke up early and heard screaming and shouting,
and then I went back to sleep because I was kind of scared.
. . . When I woke up I saw mom, I heard crying and I
walked, I stepped down from the bed with the ladder, and I
saw mom crying and Steven holding her and saying it's
okay.

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

26

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. Jones stated in her affidavit:
In the early morning of March 30, 1998, I was awoken from my sleep by
Bill Fix who was in the process of throwing me out of bed. I landed flat
on my back on the floor. I tried to sit up several times and he kept pushing me to the floor. He then grabbed my head and started violently banging it against the wall. At the same time that he was kicking and punching me. Although I was barely conscious at this time, I could see my
blood spattered on the wall. Fix ... screamed he was going to 'kill' me
several times. Fix then started punching and kicking me again. Fix...
drug me by my hair... I believe that I lost consciousness briefly. The
next thing I remember is Fix is holding me up in the air against the wall,
at the top of the stairs, with his hands around my neck, choking me, banging my head against the wall, and him screaming incoherently. I thought
I was going to die at that moment and as I turned my head to the side I
saw my three year old son looking at me in absolute horror. I will never
forget the fear and horror I saw in his face.

Id. at 1017-18.
Id. at 1023.
25.
Id. at 1022.
26.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2003

3

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 3 [2003], No. 2, Art. 9
WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 3

In response to the question of what else she remembered, she replied: "Bill
Fix slammed her against the wall or the floor. It was either one of those
because I heard a bounce."27
Soon after these events, Brittany and Steven began to exhibit significant changes in their behaviors.28 Brittany had trouble sleeping and began to experience nightmares.29 Steven's behavior became violent at school
and included swearing and choking classmates.3 ° The children began seeing
a counselor for their behavior.3' Subsequently, Steven was diagnosed with
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).3 2 After seeing a second counselor
several months later, Brittany was diagnosed with a form of depression
known as dysthmic disorder.3 3 The second counselor also confirmed Steven's diagnosis of PTSD. 34 Both children continued to see the second counselor for therapy.3 5 A clinical psychologist specializing in children also
evaluated Brittany and Steven and concluded that the children were in significant distress, expressing her worry about both children.36 She noted that
Brittany was very depressed and had admitted continued suicidal feelings.37
In March 2000, Brittany and Steven brought suit against Fix for intentional infliction of emotional distress based on Fix's alleged assault on
their mother. 38 Their father, Steven Bevan, also sued Fix for legal malpractice based on Fix's representation of Jones in the divorce proceeding against
him after Fix had previously represented him in the domestic violence proceeding.3 9 After a hearing on April 10, 2000, the district court in Teton
County granted summary judgment to Fix on all claims. Bevan and the
children appealed both claims to the Wyoming Supreme Court.40 The court
27.
Id. at 1023.
28.
Id. at 1018.
29.
Id.
30.
Id.
31.
Id.
32.
Id. Research has shown that symptoms associated with post-traumatic stress disorder
have been diagnosed in 13% to 51% of children exposed to domestic violence. Weithorn,
supra note 2, at 4. Symptoms associated with PTSD include emotional changes such as agitation or irritability, withdrawal from activities, problems in social or academic functioning, and
"reexpereincing" of the traumatic event (such as nightmares, inability to stop thinking about
it, or reenacting it through play). Id. Researchers have also observed that children with PTSD
symptoms undergo physiological changes that "correlate with their psychological symptomology and may have long-term effects on their behavior and functioning." Id.
33.
Bevan v. Fix, 42 P.3d 1013, 1018 (Wyo. 2002).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. The psychologist stated, "I think that these children are in significant distress.
I'm quite worried about both of them." Id.
38. Id. Brittany and Steven brought suit through their father, Steven Bevan, as their next
friend. Id.
39. Id.
40.
Id.
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concluded there was sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment for
Fix on the children's intentional infliction of emotional distress claims, and
4
reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in his favor. The
court also went on to decide exactly what it means to be present in order for
42
a third party to bring a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
This case note examines the history, development, and current state
of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in Wyoming, and
attempts to shed light on the future of this tort with respect to domestic violence and its impact on family law. This note evaluates the significance of
the Wyoming Supreme Court's interpretation and expansion of the tort's
requirements as to "presence," and emphasizes the tort's potential to positively affect the ability of third parties, especially children, to recover from
exposure to domestic violence. This case note argues that Bevan was correctly decided and advances the law in the best interest of society. This note
serves to open the eyes of the legal world to remedies for those indirectly
affected by domestic violence, and encourages long overdue manifestation
of general intolerance for domestic violence in our society by following the
Bevan court's example.
BACKGROUND

Generally, before the 1930s, the law allowed recovery for mental
anguish only if it was "parasitic" to another traditional tort and a physical
injury.43 Scholars began criticizing the state of the law and pushing for a
new tort that would allow recovery for mental distress." The tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress first appeared in the 1948 Supplement
to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, and has been maintained in its
current revised form in the 1965 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46
(hereinafter section 46)."5 Section 46(1) sets forth the tort's elements: "One
who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional
distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily
Id. at 1025.
Id.
Merle H. Weiner, Domestic Violence and the PerSe Standard of Outrage, 54 MD. L.
REV. 183, 198 (1995). One exception has always been for an action for assault. FOWLER V.
HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 603, 606 (2d ed. 1986). See also Annotation, Modern
Status of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as Independent Tort: "Outrage," 38
A.L.R. 4th 998 (1985).
44. Id. See, e.g., Calvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbancein the Law of
Torts, 49 HARV. L. REv. 1033 (1936); William L. Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental
Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874 (1939).
Weiner, supra note 43, at 197; Daniel Givelbar, The Right to Minimum Social De45.
cency and the Limits of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress By
Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 42, 43 (1982). "[B]y 1948 the Restatement had
reversed its position and 'restated' the law to be that one could recover for severe emotional
injuries intentionally inflicted." Id.
41.
42.
43.
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'
harm."46
Therefore, to state a claim, a plaintiff must establish four elements:
Extreme and outrageous conduct, severe emotional distress, causation, and
an intent or recklessness in causing severe emotional distress.4 7 Intentional
infliction of emotional distress is also recognized as a cause of action available to third parties who have been exposed to extreme and outrageous conduct. Third-party intentional infliction of emotional distress is set forth in
section 46(2):

Where such conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is
subject to liability if he intentionally or recklessly causes
severe emotional distress (a) to a member of such person's
immediate family who is present at the time, whether or not
such distress results in bodily harm, or (b) to any other person who is present at the time, if such distress results in bodily harm. 41
Almost all states have adopted the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, and there has been a consistent trend toward allowing recovery.49
The limits of the tort, however, remain vaguely defined.50
Determining what constitutes "outrageous" conduct and "severe"
distress is largely a subjective inquiry that has led to inconsistency in the
tort's application." Many scholars argue that outrageousness is the only real
requirement for recovery under the tort.52 "[D]espite its apparent abundance
of elements, in practice [the tort] tends to reduce to a single element - the
outrageousness of the defendant's conduct."" Thus, where extreme and
outrageous conduct can be shown, courts will suppose that such conduct
caused severe emotional distress.5
Inversely, where the outrageousness
element cannot be established, the action cannot be maintained, even if the

46.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(1) (1965).
47.
Id.
48.
Id.
49.
Annotation, Modern Status of IntentionalInfliction of Mental Distress as Independent
Tort: "Outrage," 38 A.L.R. 4th 998 (1985).
50.
Leonard Karp & Cheryl L. Karp, Beyond the Normal Ebb and Flow ... Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress in Domestic Violence Cases, 28 FAM. L.Q. 389, 397 (1994)

[hereinafter Karp & Karp].
51.
Id.
52.
David Crump, Evaluating Independent Tort Based upon "Intentional" or "Negligent " Infliction of Emotional Distress: How Can We Keep the Baby from Dissolving in the
Bath Water?, 34 ARIz. L. REv. 439,450 (1992).
53.
Givelbar, supra note 45, at 55. "Where intentional outrageous conduct is proven,
courts readily assume that such conduct caused severe distress, and where outrage is not
proven the tort fails, even if the defendant meant to cause the plaintiff severe emotional distress and succeeded." Ira Mark Ellman & Stephen D. Sugarman, Spousal Emotional Abuse as
a Tort?, 55 MD. L. REV. 1268, 1280-81 (1996).
54.
Givelbar, supra note 45, at 50.
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actor intended and did successfully create emotional distress." Difficulty
arises because the concept of "outrageousness" is highly subjective, and
section 46 does not provide meaningful guidance. As a result, courts have
formulating clear standards as to what constitutes outrageous
had difficulty
6
conduct.1
Subjectivity has also caused difficulty when courts face the issue of
whether the emotional distress in question is "severe." Section 46 suggests
that the emotional distress be "so severe that no reasonable man could be
expected to endure it.""7 Comment j to section 46 defines emotional distress
as including "all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror,
grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment,
worry, and nausea."5 " Comment j offers that the intensity and duration of
9
the distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity. Comment j also makes clear that severe distress must be proved, but suggests that
the extreme and outrageous character of the defendant's conduct is often in
6
itself important evidence that the distress has existed. ' Ultimately, the ability to recover under the tort seems to revolve around establishing outrageous
conduct.
History of IntentionalInfliction of Emotional Distressin Wyoming
Before adopting the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Wyoming Supreme Court recognized the tort of negligent infliction
6
of emotional distress in Gates v. Richardson. In Gates, the court noted that
Id. at 46.
55.
Id. See Bevan v. Fix, 42 P.3d 1013, 1020-21 (Wyo. 2002). "Unfortunately, as we
56.
noted in Kanzler v. Renner, disparities in application of the tort are prevalent due in large part
to the vague, subjective, value-laden concept of 'outrageousness' and the highly fact-specific
inquiry necessary to decide claims under it." Id. at 1021 n.7 (citing Kanzler v. Renner, 937
P.2d 1337, 1342 (Wyo. 1992). The Restatement provides vague guidance: "Generally, the
case is one in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the community would
arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead him to exclaim, 'Outrageous!'"
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965). It also provides that, for purposes of
claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress, outrageous conduct is that which is "so
outrageous in character and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of
decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community."
Id.
Id. at cmt. j.
57.
Id.
58.
Id.
59.
Id.
60.
Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 198 (Wyo. 1986).
61.
Given the relatively minor impact that recoveries in these cases would
have on the defendants, the insurance industry, and the public, and given

our general policy in favor of imposing the loss on the negligent tortfeasor rather then the innocent victim, we conclude that the tort of negligent
infliction of emotional distress is actionable in Wyoming.
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"compensation for emotional distress is not a new concept in Wyoming. We
have permitted recovery for emotional harm caused by false imprisonment,
malicious prosecution, and work-related stress."62 The tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress allows plaintiffs to recover damages where they
have suffered emotional distress as a result of witnessing the severe injury or
death of another.63 The court held that in order to bring an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must either witness the accident or soon come to the scene while the victim is still there, and prove that
he suffered emotional distress as a result of observing the infliction of serious bodily injury or the death of a relative.' Additionally, the court placed
significant limitations on the tort by restricting the class of plaintiffs allowed
to bring an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress to those who
are permitted to bring wrongful death actions in Wyoming.65 In Gates, the
family of a child who observed the child's injury after being struck by an
automobile sued the driver for negligent infliction of emotional distress."
The district court refused to allow the family's claims for negligent infliction
of emotional distress, expressing concerns of overbroad liability and asserting that legal causation must terminate somewhere.6 7 In response to those
concerns, the Wyoming Supreme Court reversed the district court's dismissal of the family's claims and stated that "the fact that legal causation
must terminate somewhere does not mean it must terminate short of mental
injuries."68

One month later, the Wyoming Supreme Court, in Leithead v.
American Colloid Co., adopted section 46's formulation of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress as a valid cause of action in Wyoming.69 The Leithead court reasoned that if a person can recover damages
for negligently inflicted emotional harm, then certainly he should have a

Id.

62. Id. at 194. See Waters v. Brand, 497 P.2d 875, 877-78 (Wyo. 1972) (holding that
recovery was permitted for emotional harm caused by false imprisonment); Cates v. Eddy,
669 P.2d 912, 921 (Wyo. 1983) (holding that recovery was permitted for emotional harm
caused by malicious prosecution); Consol. Freightways v. Drake, 678 P.2d 874 (Wyo. 1984)
(holding that recovery was permitted for emotional harm caused by work-related stress).
63.
Gates, 719 P.2d at 197.
64. Id. at 199-201. The dissenting opinion argued that a plaintiff should be allowed to
bring an action for negligent infliction of emotional distress only if the plaintiff was present at
the location of the incident to witness its occurrence. Id. at 202 (Rooney, J., dissenting).
65.
Id. at 199. In Wyoming's Wrongful Death Statute, the legislature expressed that a
wrongful death action is limited to spouses, children, and siblings, due to community policy.
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 1-38-102 (Cum. Supp. 1985). See Wetering v. Eisele, 682 P.2d 1055,
1061-62 (Wyo. 1984).
66.
Gates, 719 P.2d at 194.
67. Id. at 197.
68. Id. "We are perfectly capable of fixing limits and applying them when necessary."
Id. at 198. "
69.
Leithead v. Am. Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059 (Wyo. 1986).
https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol3/iss2/9
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cause of action for harm intentionally inflicted.7" In Leithead, an employee
sued his former employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress after
his employer discharged him for being suspected of leaking confidential
information to competitors.7 1 While the court concluded as a matter of law
that the distress suffered by the employee was not severe enough to be compensable, it nonetheless joined the vast majority of jurisdictions and adopted
the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.72
The Leithead court faced concerns that adopting the tort would flood
the courts with fraudulent claims and create potentially unlimited liability for
every type of mental disturbance. 73 The court addressed these concerns by
submitting that such problems could be solved without entirely rejecting the
action.74 It also asserted that section 46 placed several limits on the action,
and expressed its confidence that these limits, together with the common
sense of the jury, should prove to be adequate protection against fraudulent
or frivolous claims.75
Several years after Leithead, the Wyoming Supreme Court determined in Wilder v. Cody County Chamber of Commerce that the shame and
humiliation alleged by a former executive director who sued a nonprofit
corporation for intentional infliction of emotional distress after its board of
directors, dissatisfied with his financial oversight, terminated him, was
enough to create a jury question on the issue of liability. 76 The Wilder court
held there was sufficient evidence of outrageous conduct by the defendant
when, before and after the plaintiffs termination, the corporation's officials
placed the plaintiff on probation, reduced his compensation, possibly altered
his employment status, required that he publicly accept responsibility for the
defendant's financial problems without having conducted any formal investigation, and actively tried to prevent the plaintiff from obtaining employment after his termination.77 The decision in Wilder reinforced the court's
willingness, initiated in Leithead, to allow plaintiffs who establish sufficient
evidence of outrageous conduct by the defendant to maintain a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
70.
Id. at 1065. See also Sheltra v. Smith, 392 A.2d 431, 431-33 (1978) (discussing the
evolution ofjudicial recognition of the "right to recover damages for mental distress and of an
independent cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress," and exemplifying
the logical sequence of recognizing the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress after
recognizing the tort of negligent infliction of emotional distress).
Leithead, 721 P.2d at 1066-67.
71.
Id.
72.

73.

Id.

Id. at 1065-66. "While these problems are not to be dismissed lightly, they can cer74.
tainly be solved without rejecting the action entirely. That would be the equivalent of 'employing a cannon to kill a flea."' See Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 197 (Wyo. 1986)
(quoting Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d 67, 79 (Wyo. 1978)).
Leithead,721 P.2d at 1066.
75.
76.
Wilder v. Cody County Ch. of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211,223-24 (Wyo. 1994).
77.
Id.
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In 1996, Garcia v. Lawson presented an example of conduct that the
court was unwilling to characterize as outrageous in order to sustain an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.7" The plaintiff in Garcia
brought an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against a
police officer who, when he responded to the plaintiff's sexual assault
charges against her estranged boyfriend, failed to complete a quality investigation and made offensive remarks including discussing the size of a mutual
acquaintance's breasts and inviting the plaintiff to have a beer with him.79
The Garcia court concluded that the police officer's conduct was not sufficiently extreme and outrageous."0 The court noted that the defendant could
have been more considerate in his dealings with the plaintiff and that he did
fail to conduct a quality investigation, but concluded that "his conduct was at
most annoying, insulting and insensitive," and was not what the court would
"characterize as being beyond all possible bounds of decency, atrocious, or
utterly intolerable in a civilized community."'" After concluding that the
defendant's conduct was not outrageous, the court did not address whether
the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was severe.82
Justice Golden wrote strong dissenting opinions in both Wilder and
Garcia.83 He asserted the majority used no legal standard of measurement in
either case to characterize the alleged conduct of the defendant. 4 . Justice
Golden expressed his concern with the court's "establishment and principled
application of standards" with respect to the nature of the defendant's alleged conduct and the level of severity of the plaintiff's alleged emotional
reaction to that conduct.8 5 "It seems to me we must establish useful and
helpful standards against which to measure the conduct and emotional reaction to conduct because we strive to make principled decision-making in
order to treat similarly situated citizens similarly."86 Justice Golden asserted
that the explanation of the result in Wilder must be better than to say that the
employer's conduct was outrageous because the majority was sufficiently
offended by it, and that the explanation of the result in Garciamust be better
78.
Garcia v. Lawson, 928 P.2d 1164, 1167 (Wyo. 1996).
79.
Id. at 1165-66.
80.
Id.at 1167.
81.
Id. The court was referring to comment d of the Restatement for its requirement that
the conduct be "beyond all possible bounds of decency, atrocious, or utterly intolerable in a
civilized society. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. d (1965). The court then
quoted Dreja v. Vaccaro: "'The law does not afford a cause of action for bad taste, boorishness, condescension, or social ineptitude."' Dreja v. Vaccaro, 650 A.2d 1308, 1311 (D.C.
1994).
82.
Garcia, 928 P.2d at 1167.
83.
Wilder v. Cody County Ch. of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 225 (Wyo. 1994) (Golden,
J., dissenting); Garcia, 928 P.2d at 1168-69 (Golden, J., dissenting).
84.
Garcia, 928 P.2d at 1169 (Golden, J., dissenting) ("I find no standard stated in the
opinion. Is the standard objective or subjective? Is outrageousness in the eye of the beholder?").
85.
Id. at 1168 (Golden, J., dissenting).
86.
Id. at 1169 (Golden, J., dissenting).
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than to say that the police officer's conduct was not outrageous because the
majority was not sufficiently offended by it. 7 "We must have a rule of law,

not a rule of man. ' 8

A critical expansion of the tort took place in 1997 with Kanzler v.
Renner, a case dealing with emotional injury resulting from sexual harassment in the workplace.8 9 The decision in Kanzler was important because the
court expressly recognized society's gradual intolerance of sexual harassment in the workplace, and joined numerous jurisdictions that had determined that such inappropriate conduct coupled with sufficient evidence
could give rise to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. 90 In
Kanzler, a former police dispatcher brought an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against a police officer as a result of alleged sexual
misconduct by the police officer against the former dispatcher.9 The Kanzler court struggled with issues of interpreting and applying the "outrageous" element. 92 The court acknowledged that courts have been inconsistent when trying to determine what constitutes outrageous conduct. 93 "Re87.
Id. (Golden, J., dissenting). Justice Golden concluded in Garcia that reasonable persons could differ in their conclusion as to whether the police officer's conduct was extreme
and outrageous. Id. (Golden, J., dissenting).
88.
Id. (Golden, J., dissenting). "I fear what others have feared: '[T]he court embarks on
what I predict will be an endless wandering over a sea of factual circumstances, meandering
this way and that, blown about by bias and inclination, and guided by nothing steadier than
the personal preferences of the helmsmen, who change with every watch."' Id. (Golden, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Womick Co v. Casas, 856 S.W.2d 732, 737 (Tex. 1993) (Hecht, J., concurring)). Justice Golden also noted several courts who have "risen to the task" with respect
to establishing and applying standards in this area of the law to assist the court in determining
whether the conduct in question is outrageous under the circumstances. Id. (Golden, J., dissenting). He noted two standards: (1) The actor is in a position of authority and trust; and (2)
The plaintiff is peculiarly susceptible to emotional distress and the actor knows, or should
know, of that condition. Id. (Golden, J., dissenting). As to the first standard, see Crump v. P
& C Food Markets, Inc., 576 A.2d 441,448 (1990); Drejza v. Vaccaro, 650 A.2d 1308, 1312-

17 (D.C. App. 1994); Doe v. Calumet City, 641 N.E.2d 498, 507-08 (1994). As to the second
standard, see Doe, 641 N.E.2d at 507-08; Drejza, 650 A.2d at 1312-17; Denton v. Chittenden

Bank, 655 A.2d 703, 707 (1994); Pavilon v. Kaferly, 561 N.E.2d 1245, 1252 (1990).
89.
Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337, 1341-42 (Wyo. 1997).
90. Id. The court noted numerous jurisdictions that have also determined that inappropriate sexual conduct in the workplace can give rise to a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. See Bennett v. CompUSA, Inc., 1997 WL 10028, at *10 (N.D. Tex. Jan.
7, 1997); DeShiro v. Branch, 1996 WL 663974, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 1996); Howard v.
Town of Jonesville, 935 F. Supp. 855, 861-62 (W.D. La. 1996); Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau
of Greater Md., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 720, 747-48 (D. Md. 1996); Lazarz v. Brush Wellman,
Inc., 857 F. Supp. 417, 423 (E.D. Pa. 1994); Retherford v. AT & T Communications of
Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 978 (Utah 1992); Collins v. Wilcox, 600 N.Y.S.2d 884,
885-86 (Sup. Ct. 1992); Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., 262 Cal.Rptr. 842, 858 (1989);
Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 340 S.E.2d 116, 121 (1986); Howard Univ. v. Best, 484
A.2d 958, 985-86 (D.C. App. 1984); Valerio v. Dahlberg, 716 F. Supp. 1031, 1040 (S.D.
Ohio 1988).
91.
Kanzler, 937 P.2d at 1339.
92. Id. at 1342.
93. Id.
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cent decisions reveal widely varying and inconsistent attitudes regarding the
severity of [sexual] misconduct required for a showing of outrageousness.
This disparity is due in large part to the vague, subjective, and value-laden
concept of 'outrageousness,' and the highly fact-specific inquiry required of
the courts."94 The court resolved its struggle by discerning factors such as
repeated incidents of conduct and unwelcome touching, i.e. non-negligible
physical contact, that could be used to assist the court's determination
whether the particular conduct of the police officer was sufficiently outrageous.95 The court held that the defendant's alleged conduct went beyond
mere insults, indignities, and petty oppressions, and, if proved, could be considered outrageous.96 The court concluded that in the least, reasonable persons could differ in their conclusions as to whether the defendant's conduct
was outrageous and that it is for a jury to determine whether the conduct was
sufficiently outrageous for liability.97 It also held that the evidence presented
by the former dispatcher as to her mental distress, including being diagnosed
with post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression, was sufficient to
create a jury issue on the severity of her distress.9"
In Kanzler, Justice Thomas wrote a specially concurring opinion expressing his concern that Wyoming's "law in this area is not developing in a
particularly cohesive manner, noting that two members of the court dissented in Garcia v. Lawson."99 Justice Thomas viewed intentional infliction
of emotional distress as a "potentially volatile" tort, and as such, he believed
it was essential that its parameters be carefully crafted. 1" Justice Thomas
expressed his fear that trial courts and the bar in Wyoming would read into
the Kanzler decision a rule that in every case involving sexual misconduct,
reasonable men could differ as to whether the conduct is so extreme and
outrageous as to allow recovery.' ' Justice Thomas noted that after Kanzler,
a trial court might perceive that summary judgment is full of risk when the
02
basis for intentional infliction of emotional distress is sexual misconduct.1
He advised, however, that trial courts should be careful not to abandon their
important roles as gatekeepers.0 3
Beginning with Leithead, the Wyoming Supreme Court has approved the language of the comments to section 46 pertaining to evaluating
94.
Id.
95.
Id. at 1343.
96.
Id.
97.
Id.
98.
Id. at 1343-44.
99.
Id. at 1345 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted). See Garcia v. Lawson, 928
P.2d 1164, 1167 (Wyo. 1996).
100. Kanzler, 937 P.2d at 1345 (Thomas, J., concurring).
101.
Id. (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
102. Id. (Thomas, J.,
concurring). Justice Thomas referred to the Restatement's comment
h dealing with "Court andjury." See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. h (1965).
103.
Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
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the elements of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress."° The

court has consistently looked to these comments for assistance in determining what constitutes outrageous conduct, what constitutes severe emotional
distress, and whether the record discloses facts sufficient to allow a jury to
reasonably conclude that the defendant "intentionally" or "recklessly"
caused the plaintiff severe emotional distress."0 Also, beginning with Leithead the court has approved section 46's description of the roles of both
that frivojudge and jury found in comment h, noting that these roles ensure
06
lous claims can be weeded out at the summary judgment stage.
Third Party IntentionalInfliction of Emotional Distressin Wyoming
In R.D. v. W.H., the Wyoming Supreme Court expressly adopted the

formulation in section 46(2) of third-party intentional infliction of emotional
distress."0 7 In order to establish liability under section 46's provision for
third-party intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must be
"present at the time" the outrageous conduct occurred.'
In R.D. v. W.H.,
presence
element
how
the
as
to
the court looked to section 46 for guidance
should be applied:
See Kanzler, 937 P.2d at 1341; Leithead, 721 P.2d at 1066-67.
104.
See Kanzler, 937 P.2d at 1341; Leithead, 721 P.2d at 1066-67; Davis v. Consol. Oil &
105.
Gas, Inc., 802 P.2d 840, 849 (Wyo. 1990). Comment i to the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 46 states:
Intention and recklessness. The rule stated in this Section applies where
the actor desires to inflict severe emotional distress, and also where he
knows that such distress is certain, or substantially certain, to result from
his conduct. It applies also where he acts recklessly, as that term is defined in § 500, in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that
the emotional distress will follow.

§ 46 cmt. i (1965).
106.
Leithead, 721 P.2d at 1066. Comment h to the
46 states:
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §

Court and jury. It is for the court to determine, in the first instance,
whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily
so. Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the
control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability.

§ 46 cmt. h (1965).
R.D. v. W.H., 875 P.2d 26, 31 (Wyo. 1994).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

107.

It appears that, although we did not do so expressly, we intended in Leithead to adopt § 46 of the RESTATEMENT ... in its entirety. In order
to clarify the law, we hereby expressly adopt § 46(2) of the
RESTATEMENT ... as being the basis for third-party intentional infliction of emotional distress claims in Wyoming.
Id. at 32.
108.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46(2) (1965).
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Conduct directed at a thirdperson. Where the extreme and
outrageous conduct is directed at a third person, as where,
for example, a husband is murdered in the presence of his
wife, the actor may know that it is substantially certain, or
highly probable, that it will cause severe emotional distress
to the plaintiff. In such cases the rule of this Section applies. The cases thus far decided, however, have limited
such liability to plaintiffs who were present at the time, as
distinguished from those who discover later what has occurred.t"
Section 46 also includes this caveat: "The Institute expresses no opinion as
to whether there may not be other circumstances under which the actors may
be subject to liability for the intentional or reckless infliction of emotional
distress."' 0 The caveat is intended, according to comment 1,"to leave open
the possibility of situations in which presence at the time may not be required......
In R.D. v. W.H., the husband and minor child of the decedent sued
the decedent's stepfather and his physician for conduct they claimed led to
her suicide by drug overdose, claiming damages for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress." 2 The court noted these two mental
distress torts allow for recovery when the plaintiff suffers from extreme
shock, and do not allow recovery for the typical type of grief suffered by
anyone who loses a loved one.' The husband and child were not present
when the alleged sexual abuse of the decedent by the decedent's stepfather
took place or when the decedent's stepfather presented the decedent with a
loaded firearm that she later used to attempt suicide. 4 The husband and
child were not present when the stepfather's physician, knowing of her psychiatric condition and suicidal tendencies, supplied the decedent with the
prescription narcotics by which she eventually killed herself."' While the
husband and minor child did not allege that they were "present," they did
had witnessed the immediate aftermath of the decedent's
state that 1they
6
overdose.'
Because the court never expressly addressed a claim for third-party
intentional infliction of emotional distress before R.D. v. W.H., it looked to
cases in other jurisdictions for guidance in interpreting the presence re109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

R.D., 875 P.2d at 32 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 caveat (1965).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. 1(1965).
R.D., 875 P.2d at 27.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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quirement." 7 The court concluded that most of those cases held the plaintiff
must be present when the extreme and outrageous conduct occurs." 8 The
court also discovered that, pursuant to comment 1 and the caveat to section
46, courts have acknowledged that special circumstances might exist where
presence at the time of the occurrence of the outrageous conduct will not be
required." 9 The court discussed Foster v. Trentham 's, Inc., wherein a wife
made a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under section
46(2) even though she was not present during the malicious prosecution of
her husband. 20 The Foster court considered the fact that the outrageous
conduct occurred in her home and refused to dismiss her claim, holding that
the presence requirement was satisfied for the purposes of a motion to dis2
miss.' '
In its discussion, the Wyoming Supreme Court admitted, "It is generally a better practice to limit recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress to plaintiffs who were present when the outrageous conduct
occurred.' 2' The court recognized, however, that the case of R.D. v. W.H.
presented factual circumstances with respect to the presence requirement
that demanded special consideration.'
The facts showed the husband and
the minor child were not present when the defendant's outrageous conduct
took place, but that they had witnessed the immediate aftermath of the resulting suicide. 24 The court concluded the suicide was the final result of a
continuing course of conduct instigated by the defendant.2 2 The court held
that "the facts of this case place it in the narrow exception to the general rule
that a plaintiff must be present when the outrageous conduct occurs in order
to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress directed at a third
person. '"126 The court concluded that the husband and child had sufficiently
pleaded a cause of action for both intentional and negligent infliction of
emotional distress, and reversed the trial court's dismissal of these claims.'21

117.
Id.
118.
See Lund v. Caple, 675 P.2d 226, 229 (1984); Bradshaw v. Nicolay 765 P.2d 630,.
632 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
119.
See H.L.O. by L.E.O. v. Hossle, 381 N.W.2d 641 (Iowa 1986); Nancy P. v. D'Amato,
517 N.E.2d 824, 827-28 (1988).
120.
Foster v. Trentham's, Inc., 458 F. Supp. 1382 (E.D. Tenn. 1978).
121.
Id. at 1384.
122.
R.D. v. W.H., 875 P.2d 26, 33 (Wyo. 1994).
123.
Id. Here, the court applied comment I and the caveat to section 46 to the presence
requirement. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. 1,caveat (1965).
124.
R.D., 875 P.2d at 33-34.
125.
Id. at 34.
126. Id. at 33.
127.
Id. at 34-35.
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IntentionalInfliction of Emotional Distress in the Context of Domestic Violence
The law with respect to emotional distress is in a process of expansion. Much commentary exists on what the next steps should be with re29
gard to the evolution of the tort.' Especially in the area of domestic vio3
Intentional
lence, so-called "domestic torts" gradually have escalated.
and thus
torts,"
"domestic
these
of
one
is
distress
emotional
infliction of
tort's
the
of
possibilities
the
consider
to
which
provides a prolific arena in
31
law.1
family
to
application
2s

Traditionally, courts and legislatures have remained largely uninand
volved in regulating behavior with respect to the institution of marriage
13
The
'
privacy.
and
harmony"
"domestic
preserve
to
household in efforts
"domestic harmony" policy argues that states should advocate for maintaining marital relationships and not provide means for unhappy spouses to blow
3 3 The privacy argument
"their domestic grievances out of all proportion."'
3
asserts that the family should be protected from state intrusion. '" Recently,
however, courts have begun to recognize civil claims for relief in the context
of marriage, based on reasoning that tort actions may provide better remeof
dies than divorce actions.33 A national trend of judicial acknowledgment
36
place.
taken
has
relationship
marital
emotional distress claims in the
Reflecting this trend, the Wyoming Supreme Court, in McCulloh v.
Drake, held that there is an independent cause of action for intentional inflic131
tion of emotional distress in the marital setting:
We are convinced that extreme and outrageous conduct by
one spouse which results in severe emotional distress to the
other spouse should not be ignored by virtue of the marriage
of the victim to the aggressor and hold that such behavior
Dr. G. Steven Neeley, The Psychological and Emotional Abuse of Children: Suing
128.
Parents in Tort for IntentionalInfliction of Emotional Distress, 27 N. KY. L. REV. 689, 705
(2000).
Id.
129.
Id. at 700.
130.
Id.
131.
Meredith L. Taylor, North Carolina'sRecognition of Tort Liabilityfor the Intentional
132.
Infliction of Emotional Distress During Marriage, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1261, 1267
(1997).
Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce: Constraints and Pos133.
sibilities,31 NEw ENG. L. REV. 319, 328 (1993).
Id.
134.
Taylor, supra note 132, at 1267.
135.
Id.
136.
137. McCulloh v. Drake, 24 P.3d 1162, 1168-70 (Wyo. 2001). In 1987, the court invalidated interspousal immunity in Tader v. Tader, allowing a spouse to bring an action against
his or her partner in marriage. Tader v. Tader, 737 P.2d 1065, 1069 (Wyo. 1987).
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can create an independent cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.138
In so deciding, the court struggled with concerns that legal intrusion into
marital behavior was inappropriate, and that legal relief for emotional distress in addition to divorce was not justified.'39 Ultimately, the court overcame such concerns and concluded, "Behavior which is truly outrageous and
results in severe emotional distress should not be protected in some sort of
misguided attempt to promote marital peace."' 4 ° The court was also very
careful about its responsibility to guard against frivolous litigation by emphasizing that only circumstances involving "atrocious" and "outrageous"
conduct should be compensated.' 4 ' This was a critical expansion of the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress. More importantly, McCulloh
demonstrates the tort's flexible state of development, and its ripeness for
application with respect to domestic violence.
PRINCIPAL CASE

In Bevan v. Fix, the Wyoming Supreme Court evaluated Brittany
and Steven Bevan's third party claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress in a domestic violence setting. This setting is significant because the
court was able to make a solid determination that domestic violence shall not
be automatically disqualified as extreme and outrageous conduct. The court
concluded there was sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment for
William Fix on the children's intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims and therefore reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment
in Fix's favor.'42 In so concluding, the court stated that genuine issues of
material fact existed on each element of Brittany's and Steven's claims for
intentional infliction of emotional distress against Fix.'43 The court found a
reasonable basis for concluding that Fix's conduct was "of such a nature as
would ordinarily cause emotional injury to mere bystanders, even more so if
they were the family members of the person being assaulted."'" Therefore,
the court determined that a reasonable jury could find that Fix, by his con-

138.
McCulloh, 24 P3d at 1170.
139.
Id. at 1169.
140.
Id. (citing Henriksen v. Cameron, 662 A.2d 1135, 1139 (Me. 1993)).
141.
Id.
142.
Bevan v. Fix, 42 P.3d 1013, 1017 (Wyo. 2002).
143.
Id.
144.
Id. at 1025. The court stated: "Additionally, the fact that the witnesses are the young
children of the woman assaulted would certainly cause the average person to anticipate that
those children may experience severe 'fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea' as a result of the witnessed conduct." Id.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2003

17

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 3 [2003], No. 2, Art. 9
WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 3

caused severe emotional distress to Brittany and Steven
duct, recklessly
45
Bevan.1
In its analysis, the Wyoming Supreme Court in Bevan made a detailed outline of section 46(2)(a), showing exactly what the children, as third
parties, must prove to claim injuries for emotional distress caused by outrageous conduct:
1) That the conduct was "extreme and outrageous;"
2) That such conduct was directed at a third person;
3) That the claimant is a member of the immediate family
of the third person;
4) That the claimant was personally present when the extreme and outrageous conduct took place;
5) That the claimant sustained severe emotional distress as
a result of that conduct (whether or not the claimant sustained bodily harm); and
6) That the person whose conduct is complained of "intencaused severe emotional distress to
tionally" or "recklessly"
46
the claimant. 1
The district court based its grant of summary judgment to Fix on the
first element. 47 It concluded that Fix's conduct was not extreme and outrageous as a matter of law. 4 The district court reasoned that the case involved
"one isolated altercation," that there was no "continuing course of abuse,"
and what the children saw was not sufficient to support their claims, al' 49 The district court
though the conduct they observed was "deplorable."'
struggled with the difficult task of determining what constitutes outrageous
conduct:
Disputes over boundary lines, over the cause of motor vehicle collisions, or even over a multitude of real or imagined
wrongs, are likely to cause tempers to flare; words (vulgar
or otherwise) to be uttered in anger; fists - or anything else

145.
146.
R.D.v.
n.5.
147.
148.
149.

Id.
Id.at 1019. In a footnote the court explained that the Wyoming Supreme Court in
W.H recognized and applied comment I and the caveat to this requirement. Id. at 1019
Id. at 1019.
Id.
Id.
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handy - to be shaken; and assaults to occur. Such happenings are wholly unplanned, spur-of-the-moment occurrences; unfortunately, they occur all too frequently. But we
cannot say that the brief outbursts constitute 'extreme and
outrageous' conduct. Such unfortunate occurrences occur
all too often between intimates and are properly the subject
of criminal and injunctive relief. However, not every domestic altercation constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct or results in sufficiently severe emotional distress to
support a third party claim. Absent a showing of exceptional circumstances, such as a continuing course of abuse
and facts showing severe emotional distress to those third
party claimants as a result of what they witnessed, such an
altercation will not support a claim for intentional infliction
50
of emotional distress. 1

The district court therefore thought it proper to grant summary judgment to
151

Fix on the claims.

The Wyoming Supreme Court, for four reasons, disagreed with the
district court's reasoning and its application of section 46(2)(a) to the case,
particularly with respect to the first element.1 2 First, the court stated there
was no language in section 46, or the illustrations that accompanied it, to
suggest that a "continuing course of abuse" instead of a single "isolated altercation" was required to establish liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress.'
The court pointed out that all of the twenty-two illustrations drawn from actual cases, utilized by the comments to section 46, involved isolated incidents. 5 4 The court also emphasized no rule of law was
revealed in section 46 or ever announced by the court in its application of
section 46 which requires that the alleged conduct be repetitive or recurrent
in order to be considered extreme and outrageous.155 "On the contrary, in
Kanzler v. Renner, a case involving sexual harassment in the workplace, [the
court] expressly recognized the inverse proposition: '[R]epeated harassment
...may compound the outrageousness of incidents which, taken individu' 56
ally, might not be sufficiently extreme to warrant liability.""9
Second, the Wyoming Supreme Court concluded that the district
court erred in reasoning that because the alleged extreme and outrageous
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

156.

Id. at 1019-20.
Id.
Id. at 1020.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id. See also Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337, 1343 (quoting Boyle v. Wenk, 392

N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (1979) (citation omitted)).
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conduct amounted to domestic violence among intimates, it was necessary to
make a "showing of exceptional circumstances," such as a "continuous
course of abuse."' 57 The court noted that agreement with such a conclusion
would impose a greater burden on that particular class of plaintiffs than was
set forth in section 46.158 The court refused to impose this additional burden.1" 9 Additionally, the court reviewed its prior jurisprudence regarding
whether conduct is "extreme and outrageous" for purposes of evaluating a
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, and emphasized that it
has consistently looked to the language in comments d and h to section 46
for guidance. 6 ° The court asserted the district court's role was one of gate
keeping and consisted solely of the responsibility "to eliminate those frivolous and meritless claims in which no reasonable jury, composed of a fair
cross-section of the community, could find the defendant's conduct suffi'
ciently extreme and outrageous to permit recovery." 161
Third, the Wyoming Supreme Court concluded that the district court
erred when it reasoned that because Fix's conduct was "properly the subject
of criminal or injunctive relief," it went against a determination that the behavior was "extreme or outrageous.' 1 62 Instead the court emphasized that
"the fact that the alleged conduct has been criminalized would appear to
weigh in favor of recognition that society has determined the acts to be injuindignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppresrious as beyond 'mere insults,
' ' 161
trivialities.
other
or
sions,
Finally, the Wyoming Supreme Court concluded that although the
extreme and outrageous conduct in question could be classified as a "domestic altercation," the fundamental analysis used to decide the case could not
be modified to require a showing of exceptional circumstances." The court
generally agreed with the district court's statement that "not every domestic
altercation constitutes extreme and outrageous conduct or results in suffi157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
added:

Bevan, 42 P.3d at 1020.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1020-21.
Id. at 1021.
Id.
Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 46 cmt. d (1965)). The court also

Lest any should misunderstand, this court is not holding, nor even implying, that all criminal conduct is per se "extreme and outrageous" for purposes of deciding an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
Rather, we simply note that it is a factor that cannot be used logically to
militate against a finding that the conduct is "extreme and outrageous" in
the context of a summary judgment proceeding on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
Id. at 1021 n.8.
Id. at 1022.
164.
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ciently severe emotional impact to support a third party claim," but emphasized that it had consistently rejected "floodgate of litigation" reasoning to
65
support the denial of emotional distress claims, and was doing so again.'
The court found that Fix's conduct was behavior beyond mere insults, indignities, and petty oppressions and that if proved, could be considered "outra66 Because
geous, atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized society."'
reasonable minds could differ as to whether Fix's conduct was extreme and
outrageous, it was for a jury to determine whether it was sufficiently outrageous to warrant imposing liability upon Fix.' 67
The district court based its grant of summary judgment on the first
element of Brittany's and Steven's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Wyoming Supreme Court, however, for reasons of judicial economy, furthering the development of the law in this area, and because the children's failure to satisfy any single element of the tort would
support affirmance, continued its analysis by addressing the remaining elements of the claims. 6 s In addressing the remaining elements, the Bevan
court summarily noted that the second and third elements of the tort were
satisfied, as Fix's conduct was directed to a third person (Jones) and Brittany
69
and Steven were members of Jones's immediate family.' As to the fourth
element, whether the children were personally present at the time the outrageous conduct took place, Fix insisted that the court reject Brittany's claim
70 Because of
because she was not an eyewitness to the outrageous conduct.
71
this, the court analyzed at length the meaning of the "presence" element.'
The court revisited the conclusions it reached in R.D. v. W.H. regarding the presence element of a third party intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, and emphasized its reliance on comment I and the caveat to section 46.172 Because the claim in R.D. v. W.H. was decided by putting it outside the general rule that the claimant must be "present at the time"
of the alleged outrageous conduct, the court had not expressly addressed
what it means to be "present." Thus, the Bevan court considered it as an
issue of first impression in the state of Wyoming.'73
In R.D. v. .H., the court engaged in a discussion of section 46's
guidance in comment I and the Wyoming Supreme Court's prior treatment
of the "presence" element.' 74 The court concluded that a plaintiff need not
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.

1021.
1022.

1023.
1022-23.
1024.
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necessarily visually observe the outrageous conduct to be considered "present at the time" the conduct occurs.'75 It discussed the definition, of "present" as found in Webster's Third New InternationalDictionary: "being in
one place and not elsewhere; being within reach, sight, or call or within contemplated limits; being in view or at hand; being before, beside, with, or in
the same place as someone or something."' 76 The court reached its holding
that
[I]n order for a plaintiff to be considered 'present at the
time' of the outrageous conduct for purposes of an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, he must simply
show his 'sensory and contemporaneous observance' of the
defendant's acts. Consequently, the claimant is not required
to have seen the outrageous acts but may still recover, without resort to the Restatement caveat, if he gained personal
and contemporaneous knowledge of them through the use of
his remaining senses.177
After this review, the court then decided that the record before it disclosed
sufficient facts to reveal Brittany's "sensory and contemporaneous" observance of Fix's conduct toward her mother to preclude summary judgment in
Fix's favor on this element.'
The court also concluded that there was sufficient evidence of emotional distress in the record to preclude summary judgment for Fix.'79 These
facts included alleged changes in Brittany and Steven's behavior, their deposition testimony, Jones's affidavit, and deposition testimony of two counselors and a psychologist that included diagnoses of the children with posttraumatic stress and dysthmic disorders. 8 ° This evidence was enough to
give rise to a genuine issue of material fact with respect to severe emotional
distress. 8'
Additionally, the court concluded that the record revealed facts sufficient to allow a jury to reasonably conclude that Fix "intentionally" or
"recklessly" caused severe emotional distress to the children.' 82

175.
176.

Id.

177.
178.
179.
180.

Bevan, 42 P.3d at 1024.
Id.
Id. at 1025.
Id.

WEBSTER'S THIRDNEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

1793 (3d ed. 1971).

181.
Id.
182.
Id. Comment i to section 46 of the RESTATEMENT provides the following guidance as
to what constitutes intention and recklessness:
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The assault in question was of a type and of such nature as
would ordinarily cause emotional injury to mere bystanders,
even more if they were the family members of the person
being assaulted. Additionally, the fact that the witnesses are
the young children of the woman assaulted would certainly
cause the average person to anticipate that those children
may experience 'fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation,
worry, and
embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment,
18 3
nausea' as a result of the witnessed conduct.
The court thus concluded that each element of the children's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress against Fix contained genuine issues
of material fact, and reversed and remanded the district court's grant of
summary judgment to Fix.' 4
ANALYSIS

The result in Bevan powerfully impacts the area of family law by
soundly interpreting domestic violence as the kind of outrageous conduct
that, if proven, establishes liability under the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. This is important because history displays a longstanding habit of sweeping domestic violence under the rug and underestimating its effects. The Bevan court's interpretation of the tort's "presence"
element clearly extends the remedy to third parties detrimentally affected by
exposure to domestic violence, with special consideration given to children.
With Bevan as precedent, family law practitioners will have a significant
guidepost by which to evaluate and advance claims for third party victims of
domestic violence. Lastly, Bevan made a positive advance at a ripe stage of
development in the law by manifesting an increased societal intolerance for
domestic violence.

Intention and recklessness. The rule stated in this Section applies where
the actor desires to inflict severe emotional distress, and also where he
knows that such distress is certain, or substantially certain, to result from
his conduct. It applies also where he acts recklessly ... in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that the emotional distress will follow.

§ 46 cmt. i (1965).
Bevan, 42 P.3d at 1025 (quoting RESTATEMENT

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

(SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. j
(1965)).
184. Id. InMarch 2004, the parties executed a settlement agreement with an order to seal
the record as to information about that settlement, and an order of dismissal with prejudice

183.

was entered.
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IntentionalInfliction of Emotional Distress in a Domestic Violence Context
Recognition of the prevalence of domestic violence in our society
has escalated in the past two decades, but there is still a tendency to deemphasize or discount it as unworthy of being treated like other forms of
societal violence.' 85 The Bevan court moved in the right direction when it
refused to accept the reasoning employed by the district court that absent a
showing of exceptional circumstances a domestic altercation will not support
86 In so concluding,
a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.'
the court sent a clear message that domestic violence is not to be set aside as
a separate area of conduct that warrants more scrutinizing evaluation.
The court built on precedent it had recently established in McCulloh
v. Drake, where it adopted the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in the marital setting.'8 7 The tort was then appropriately expanded in
Bevan when the court clearly established domestic violence as conduct that
can be sufficiently extreme and outrageous to establish liability to third party
witnesses."' Because the term "outrageous" is highly subjective, some
courts have concluded that domestic violence does not qualify as outrageous
conduct. Since the success of claims for intentional infliction of emotional
distress generally turns on whether the plaintiff can show that the defendant's conduct was "outrageous", the tort is inconsistently applied, especially in domestic violence cases.
Courts that have addressed the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress in the context of domestic violence
have taken inconsistent approaches that have resulted in inconsistent outcomes .... [T]here is no consensus on at least
of "outrageousone key issue: How to analyze the element
89
ness" in a domestic violence situation.1
In demonstration of such inconsistency, the district court in Bevan
reasoned that since the extreme and outrageous conduct alleged in that case
constituted domestic violence among intimates, it meant that these plaintiffs
Joseph S. Volpe, Effects of Domestic Violence on Children and Adolescents: An
185.
Overview, (1996), availableat http://www.aaets.org/arts/art8.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2003).
Bevan, 42 P.3d at 1020.
186.
See McCulloh v. Drake, 24 P.3d 1162, 1168-70 (Wyo. 2001).
187.
Bevan, 42 P.3d at 1022.
188.
[W]e find that Fix's allege conduct, including beating, kicking, punching,
dragging by the hair, and choking Jones while screaming that he wanted
to kill her, is behavior beyond mere insults, indignities, and petty oppressions and which, if proved, could be construed as outrageous, atrocious,
and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.
Id.
189.

Weiner, supra note 43, at 213.
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must make a showing of exceptional circumstances in order to subject the
9
actor to liability for intentional infliction of emotional distress. ' In rejecting the district court's reasoning, however, the Wyoming Supreme Court
took a step in the right direction by refusing to allow domestic violence to be
grounds alone for dismissing conduct as outrageous.' 9'
The Bevan court insisted that courts should not be able to exclude a
particular group of plaintiffs or make it especially difficult for them to bring
the same cause of action as other plaintiffs. 9 2 Contrary reasoning eviscerates many of the purposes behind the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, including: (1) deterring extreme and outrageous conduct
(regardless of the subject matter of such conduct) which causes severe emotional distress to others (either the object or witness of such conduct); (2)
punishing the actor of such conduct; and (3) compensating those who have
93 These pursuffered severe emotional distress as a result of such conduct.'
poses go to the heart of how tort law should function, not only punishing and
discouraging conduct that causes severe emotional distress to others, but also
as a means by which victims can be compensated for their sufferserving
94
ing.

In Bevan, the Wyoming Supreme Court correctly and fairly asserted
that the subject matter of the complained conduct and the relationship of the
parties should not change the requirements or impose an additional burden
on any certain class of plaintiffs from that which is set forth in Section 46. If
conduct that was sufficiently extreme and outrageous caused severe emotional distress to someone, it does not matter what the conduct was concerning or who the victim happened to be. For the court to distinguish between
subject matter of conduct or class of plaintiffs would be for the court to
abandon neutrality and operate a selective justice system of unfair bias and
prejudice. "Clearly, [the court] rejected arguments to effectively close the
courts to a class of plaintiffs in Leithead and Gates, [and] again [the court]
do[es] so in the instant case."' 95
The holding in Bevan will undoubtedly encounter resistance and
criticism, especially "floodgate of litigation" arguments concerned with
courts being bombarded with litigation by victims of domestic altercations
alleged to be outrageous conduct. Such arguments are likely to criticize the
Bevan court for extending the tort too far, perhaps asserting that the decision
makes the tort too easy to claim, too easy to apply, and too easy to distribute
excessive verdicts, thus weighing the system down and flooding it with
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Bevan, 42 P.3d at 1020.
Id.
Id.
Neeley, supra note 128, at 711.
Weiner, supra note 43, at 213.
Bevan, 42 P.3d at 1022.
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feigned distress and meritless claims. The Wyoming Supreme Court effectively addressed these concerns starting with R.D. v. W.H., McCulloh, and
now in Bevan.1 96 The court has consistently renounced "floodgate of litigation" arguments advocating the denial of emotional distress claims, and has
instead taken steps to fashion the law to effectively safeguard against such
concerns.' 97 Specifically, in McCulloh, the court stated:
We emphasize that a high standard for recovery shall exist
and direct trial courts to be especially cautious when handling such claims. The focus of such claims must be on the
element of outrageousness, and the scrutiny must be stringent enough so that the social good which comes from recognizing the tort in a marital setting will not be undermined
by an invasive flood of meritless litigation ....[W]e set the
threshold of outrageousness high in hopes it will adequately
defend against a flood of frivolous litigation." '98
The court did not abandon this trend in Bevan, and provided no
grounds for speculating that it intends to relax these standards in the future.
The Bevan court insisted that the threshold of outrageousness be set high,
and reminded district courts of their important gate keeping function by emphasizing its faith in the system and the role of court and jury to eliminate
frivolous and meritless claims. 99 Having expressly adopted the Restatement's description of the roles of judge and jury with respect to the application of the "outrageous" element, the court trusted that the district courts'
gate keeping function will effectively filter those claims "in which no reasonable jury, composed of a fair cross-section of the community, could find
the defendant's conduct sufficiently extreme and outrageous to permit recovery." 2"
The court continued to address concerns of being flooded with litigation by declaring that even while it must recognize that unfortunately domestic violence is widespread, as well as society's tolerance of it, the court
cannot allow judicial fear of an avalanche of cases due to
the ubiquity of the conduct alleged as 'extreme and outrageous' to deny a remedy to those individual parties with legitimate claims. Instead, [the court] remain[s] confident that

196.
197.

Id. at 1025.
Id. at 1021.

198.
199.
200.

McCulloh v. Drake, 24 P.3d 1162, 1169-70 (Wyo. 2001).
Bevan, 42 P.3d at 1021-22.
Id. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmts. h and j (1965).
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lower courts are capable of properly separating those cases

with merit from those without.01

The court could not be clearer in its persistent determination not to allow
"floodgate" of litigation arguments to hinder what the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress was designed to do: Allow those severely
emotionally injured by extreme and outrageous conduct to recover, and ensure that those who create such extreme and outrageous conduct are liable

for their actions.
The ImportantAbility of Third Partiesto Recover From Exposure to Domestic Violence
The Wyoming Supreme Court's analysis in Bevan is useful to the
future of this tort's application to domestic violence, and changes the face of
domestic law in Wyoming by solidly paving a way for third parties to recover when they have contemporaneously witnessed domestic violence.
Recent studies have suggested that witnessing domestic violence results in
20 2 In
traumatic effects distinct from the effects of direct physical abuse.
McCulloh, the Wyoming Supreme Court expressly recognized the severity
of emotional pain and the need to legally protect against it: "Emotional distress is as real and tormenting as physical pain, and psychological well-being
' 3 Therefore,
deserves as much legal protection as physical well-being."
third parties who are indirectly exposed to domestic violence, but who suffer
severe emotional distress as a result, deserve as much legal protection as
those directly victimized by domestic violence. Since inter-spousal tort actions for emotional distress were first allowed in McCulloh, the tort was ripe
Bevan, 42 P.3d at 1022. Previously, when the court adopted the tort of negligent
201.
infliction of emotional distress in Gates v. Richardson, it addressed similar concerns that the
new tort would overburden the judicial system. Gates v. Richardson, 719 P.2d 193, 197
(Wyo. 1986). The court concluded: "If the only purpose of our law was to unburden the
court system, then we would reach the zenith of judicial achievement simply by closing the
district courts to all litigants and allowing all wrongs to come to rest on innocent victims." Id.
See generally Weiner, supra note 43, and cases cited therein (discussing the current law and
its ripeness for application of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in cases
involving domestic violence); Karp & Karp, supra note 50, and cases cited therein (encouraging lawyers to keep pace with the developing body of new tort law in the area of domestic
violence); Neeley, supra note 128, and cases cited therein (exploring the possibilities of children suing their parents for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, and the contention
that emotional distress is at least as damaging as physical abuse, and is likely to be even more
devastating than physical abuse).
Neeley, supra note 128, at 691. "[C]hid development experts and other professionals
202.
have identified these more covert forms of abuse as causing 'at least as much long term damage to the child as does a brutal physical battering."' Id. "Traumatic stress is produced by
exposure to events that are so extreme or severe and threatening, that they demand extraordinary coping efforts. Such events are often unpredicted and uncontrollable. They overwhelm
a person's sense of safety and security." Volpe, supra note 185.
McCulloh v. Drake, 24 P.3d 1162, 1169 (Wyo. 2001) (citing Henriksen v. Cameron,
203.
622 A.2d 1135, 1139 (Me. 1993)).
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for expansion to third parties. The next logical step in the tort's evolution
was to make clear that emotionally distressed third parties, specifically children, have a tort cause of action as well.2" 4 The Bevan court effectively took
that next step.
The court followed the logic set forth in McCulloh and carefully
evaluated what it means to be "present at the time" for purposes of bringing
a third party intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. By expanding
the "presence" element to require that a plaintiff need only show his sensory
and contemporaneous observance of the defendant's outrageous acts, the
Bevan court enabled third parties exposed to domestic violence to more easily obtain a tort remedy for suffering emotional distress." 5 The court acknowledged the significance and potential severity of indirect exposure to
domestic violence by allowing those who have not visually seen the outrageous conduct, but who have contemporaneous and sensory knowledge of it,
to satisfy the "presence" requirement of the tort. In so doing, the court
clearly reinforced the importance of compensating injured parties, and sent a
message that victims of domestic violence, directly or indirectly, are no exception. 206
The decision in Bevan also effectively serves necessary goals, central to tort law, of punishing wrongdoers and deterring socially undesirable
conduct.20 7 Importantly, the scope of the tort remedy for third party victims
of domestic violence clearly revolves around placing responsibility squarely
on adults who use violent behavior. It maintains focus on the cause of the
endless detrimental effects of domestic violence by holding violent adults
responsible for their outrageous behavior and forcing them to answer directly to third party victims of their conduct. It is more desirable to hold
violent adults responsible for ending the use of violence than to force society
to ultimately bear the responsibility later on when many such children become dysfunctional, violent adults.20 8
Special Significance to Children Exposed to Domestic Violence
Children are perhaps the most common and vulnerable victims of
indirect exposure to domestic violence, and are often severely emotionally
scarred. It is estimated that over three million children are at risk of exposure to domestic violence every year. 20 9 "In a large percentage of families,
children have been present when the abuse occurred .... Even if the child
is not physically injured, he [or she] likely will suffer emotional trauma from
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Neeley, supra note 128, at 705.
Bevan, 42 P.3d 1013, 1024 (Wyo. 2002).
Id. at 1022.
Id.
Edleson, supra note 3.
Volpe, supra note 185.
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witnessing violence between his [or her] parents. '2'0 The various effects of
domestic violence on children, however, include much more than immediate
2 t In ademotional trauma and have been the subject of much recent study.
dition to adverse emotional and behavioral functioning, studies have revealed problems in cognitive functioning and development, especially with
respect to the attitudes children develop about the use of violence and con1 2 Studies
flict resolution, including justifying their own use of violence.
have also revealed longer-term problems that surface in adults who were
witness to domestic violence as children, including depression, traumarelated symptoms, low self-esteem, poor anger management and problem
solving skills, substance abuse, problems parenting their own children, and
2 3 These problems ultiproblems in their own adult intimate relationships.
mately come to bear on society in many ways, including continued patterns
of domestic and societal violence and abuse, increased need for social, behavioral, and substance abuse programs, and endless effects of various psy1
In an age
chological problems manifested in school and at the workplace.
syspolitical
and
legal
the
for
is
time
it
awareness,
social
and
of information
reintegrate
and
whole
a
as
society
of
tems to harness the responsibility
for
accountability
and
search results to arrive at the best possible remedies
the countless effects of domestic violence.
"Children are among the most vulnerable members of society and
2 5 Unfortuthe state has an interest in ensuring their emotional well-being."
nately, while children are an obvious, substantial, and identifiable component in the domestic violence cycle, children indirectly impacted by domes2 6 Not nearly
tic violence are often ignored with respect to civil liability.
enough significance has been attached to compensating emotionally injured
children exposed to domestic violence for the effects they will likely suffer
210.
211.

State ex rel Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 229 (Mo. 1982) (en banc).
Edleson, supra note 3. "Children who witness violence between adults in their homes

212.

Id. A 1995 study's findings showed that "adolescent boys incarcerated for violent

have become more visible inthe spotlight of public attention." Id.
crimes who had been exposed to family violence believed more than others that 'acting aggressively enhances one's reputation or self-image.'

Believing that aggression would en-

hance their self-image significantly predicted violent offending." Id.
213. Id. A 1995 "study of 550 undergraduate students found that witnessing violence as a

child was associated with adult reports of depression, trauma-related symptoms and low self-

esteem among women and trauma-related symptoms alone among men." Id. A 1996 study
"found that among 123 adult women who had witnessed domestic violence as a child greater

distress and lower social adjustment existed when compared to 494 non-witnesses." Id. See
also C. McNeal & P.R. Amato, Parents' Marital Violence: Long-term Consequences for
Children, 19 J.FAM. ISSUES 123, 123-39 (1998), availableat 1998 WL 12555911.
214. See Neeley, supra note 128, at 690-97. "A child's exposure to the father abusing the
mother is the strongest risk fact for transmitting violent behavior from one generation to the
next." American Psychological Association, Violence and the Family: Report of the APA
PresidentialTask Force on Violence in the Family, (1996), availableat http://www.acadv.org

/children.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2003).
215.

Neeley, supra note 128, at 710.

216.

Id. at 702.
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throughout their lives. There are clear policy reasons for extending the tort
remedy of intentional infliction of emotional distress to children so impacted
by domestic violence. Perhaps the strongest reason is that emotionally injured children need to be directly compensated early on, or the loss will ultimately come to bear on society in other forms, such as social programs or a
continuation of the type of conduct that caused their emotional injury.217
The result of directly compensating children already exposed to domestic
violence is at least two-fold. First, it provides them with means to seek appropriate psychological care. The reality is that the cost of mental health
care is exorbitant and goes beyond the financial reach of most social classes.
One source of paying for mental health care is health insurance, but it is estimated that 11.3 million children are uninsured in this country, and many
insurance policies do not cover mental health services anyway.218 Second, it
serves to deter future violent domestic conduct by punishing adults found to
be responsible for such conduct. Directly compensating those injured by
domestic violence serves as a demonstration to children and adults that such
conduct is unacceptable and is not without consequences in our society.
The holding in Bevan as to the "presence" requirement for third
party intentional infliction of emotional distress significantly advances tort
law in the state of Wyoming. Even if the child has not visually observed the
conduct, but has contemporaneous and sensory observance of the conduct,
he or she can still recover. This carries special significance in its large potential effect on children who witness domestic violence, and helps the state
move soundly in the direction of ensuring their emotional well being by insisting that these kinds of injuries are worthy of compensation.
Significance to Family Law Practitioners
In recent years, society and the legal system have considered more
seriously the issue of domestic violence.2 19 Consequently, there has been an
emergence of so-called "domestic torts" that provide new legal standards of
217.
Judith G. McMullen, The Inherent Limitations ofAfter-the-Fact Statutes Dealing with
the Emotional and Sexual Maltreatment of Children, 41 DRAKE L. REV. 483, 499 (1992)
(citing ELIANA GIL, TREATMENT OF ADULT SURVIVORS OF CHILDHOOD ABUSE 52-54 (1988)).
See also Judith G. McMullen, Privacy, Family Autonomy, and the Maltreated Child, 75
MARQ. L. REV. 569, 584-96 (1992). Dr. G. Steven Neeley also asserts, "An essential tenet
of
tort law is that injured parties should be compensated for their loss, and the maltreated child's
only means of compensation may well come from a judgment against the abusive parent."
Neeley, supra note 128, at 703. "Social learning theory would suggest that children who
witness violence may also learn to use it." Edleson, supra note 3. A study of 2,245 children
and teenagers "found that recent exposure to violence in the home was a significant factor in
predicting a child's violent behavior." Id.
218.
Betsy McAllister Groves, Mental Health Servicefor Children Who Witness Domestic
Violence, (2002), available at http://www.athealth.com/Practioner/ceduc/dv-children.htmi
(last visited Mar. 23, 2003).
219. Weiner, supra note 43, at 197.
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22
accountability, mostly among spouses. " These domestic torts include assault and battery, wrongful death, false imprisonment, use of excessive
221 Most of the focus of
force, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
the increase in problem recognition, remedies, and legal standards, however,
222 These domestic torts have been ripe
has been on the marital relationship.
for expansion to become applicable to the same types of physical and emotional injury that are inflicted upon children and other third parties affected
in domestic violence situations. Bevan initiated such an expansion in Wyoming, providing a useful interpretation and application of intentional infliction of emotional distress against a backdrop of domestic violence. The
court's analysis in Bevan is a helpful perspective from which to evaluate the
use of this tort in the arena of domestic violence.

The result in Bevan brought essential definition to the previously
hazy silhouette of the tort's required elements. Although still in a stage of
major development, Bevan is a good start toward establishing and solidifying definite guidelines and limitations for the tort. While the elements still
contain problematic key word requirements such as "outrageous," "severe,"
and "present," the Bevan court took the risk of doing more than merely reflecting "the practical necessity of drawing the line somewhere," as com223 Especially with respect to the "presence"
ment 1 to section 46 suggests.
element, the court drew new lines and evaluated numerous possible limitations that might be placed on the tort's application. Thus, Bevan will be of
great significance to family law practitioners in Wyoming by providing a
foundation upon which to meaningfully evaluate and utilize the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress in domestic violence situations.
Manifestation of Intolerancefor Domestic Violence
Tort law generally frames society's interests and values and admin224
isters how human beings, as members of society, should treat each other.
"Law is a language of power, a particularly authoritative discourse. Law can
pronounce definitively what something is or is not and how a situation or
event is to be understood . . . . Legal language does more than express
''
thoughts. It reinforces certain world views and understandings of events. 225
The law needs to be flexible enough to move with the ebb and flow of society's interests and values. Following the Bevan court's model, if lawmakers
can successfully listen to society's increasing intolerance of domestic vioKarp & Karp, supra note 50, at 389.
220.
Id.
221.
222. Weiner, supra note 43, at 196.
Bevan v. Fix, 42 P.3d 1013, 1024 (Wyo. 2002).
223.
Neeley, supra note 128, at 711. "One function of tort law is to moralize." Id.
224.
Weiner, supra note 43, at 195 (citing Lucinda M. Finley, Breaking Women's Silence
225.
in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
886, 888 (1989)).
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lence and echo such intolerance by not allowing the subject matter surrounding a tort claim to alter the nature of its requirements, then the law is functioning as it should.226 In Bevan, the Wyoming Supreme Court sent a significant message of intolerance for domestic violence by reflecting an increased societal awareness and intolerance in the legal system.
Also, with respect to the court's recognition of society's gradually
increasing intolerance of domestic violence, a reasonable analogy can be
drawn from the manner in which the court reacted to emotional distress resulting from sexual harassment in Kanzler. Referring to its conclusion that
inappropriate sexual conduct in the workplace can give rise to a claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the Kanzler court declared the
following pronouncement of the Utah Supreme Court persuasive:
It is worth stating forcefully that any other conclusion would
amount to an intolerable refusal to recognize that our society
has ceased seeing sexual harassment in the work place as a
playful inevitability that should be taken in good spirits and
has awakened to the fact that sexual harassment has a corrosive effect on those who engage in it as well as those who
are subjected to it and that such harassment has far more to
do with the abusive exercise of one person's power over another than it does with sex.227
While the court in Bevan did not expressly say so, the same reasoning can be effectively applied to domestic violence. While there is still an
unacceptable prevalence of domestic violence in society, the view of domestic violence as the norm and as something with which members of society
must live has significantly decreased. 2 ' Realization of the widespread destructive effects of domestic violence has escalated, along with a reactionary
226.

Id. The Wyoming Supreme Court in Bevan concluded:
The district court was in error by reasoning that simply because the alleged extreme and outrageous conduct of this case constitutes domestic
violence among intimates it somehow necessitates that the plaintiffs make
a "showing of exceptional circumstances" such as a "continuing course of
abuse" by the defendant. Our affirmance of this conclusion would, as a
consequence, impose on a certain class of plaintiffs a burden greater than
that set forth in the general rules of Restatement § 46 based solely on the
subject matter of the complained conduct an the relationship of the parties. We decline to impose such an additional burden.

Bevan, 42 P.3d at 1020.
227.
Kanzler v. Renner, 937 P.2d 1337, 1341-42 (quoting Retherford v. AT & T Communications of Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 978 (Utah 1992)). See e.g., Louise F. Fitzgerald, Science v. Myth: The Failureof Reason in the Clarence Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1399, 1399 (1992); Carol Sanger, The Reasonable Woman and the OrdinaryMan, 65
S. CAL. L. REV. 1411, 1415 (1992).
228.
Weiner, supra note 43, at 195.
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consideration of such conduct as intolerable in a civilized society.2 9 For the
law to ensure that indirect as well as direct victims of domestic violence can
seek remedies through such independent civil actions as intentional infliction
of emotional distress is for the law to function as it was established to function.23 °
Domestic violence is a monstrous problem that has no single immediate, readily apparent solution. Thus, constant smaller advances like that
set forth in Bevan are the best way to successfully "fight the battle" against
domestic violence. In the words of Charles Caleb Colton, "Where we cannot
'
Without preaching, the Bevan court
invent, we may at least improve."231
took a step in the right direction by moving with society closer to a general
recognition that all domestic violence is outrageous.232
CONCLUSION

The decision in Bevan v. Fix reveals a promising new path upon
which third party victims of domestic violence can embark to recover under
tort remedy. Bevan provides a helpful perspective for recognizing that the
effects of indirect exposure to domestic violence can be as devastating as
direct exposure, especially upon children. The Bevan court sets a good example of how the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress should be
interpreted, evaluated, and applied - a solid stepping-stone from which to
continue seeking appropriate justice for all victims of domestic violence. In
Wyoming, Bevan should serve as a key in the hands of legal practitioners to
open doors to possibilities in family law to aggressively seek recovery not
only for those directly victimized by domestic violence, but also for those
indirectly affected. Courts most likely will continue to struggle with the
interpretation and application of such vague requirements as "outrageous,"
but if courts follow Bevan's example of exercising practical necessity when
defining the tort's standards and limits, while allowing the tort enough flexibility to accommodate the devastating effects of third party exposure to domestic violence, then the law will function in its best capacity. Bevan should
serve as a guiding light to lower courts for overcoming common reluctance
to classify domestic violence as outrageous conduct. Bevan demonstrates
how the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress can be utilized as
one way to effectively combat domestic violence, in both prevention and
remedy.
NATALIE KAY Fox
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Charles Caleb Colton was an English author and clergyman (1780-1832).
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